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POST-NKRUMAH GHANA: THE LEGAL PROFILE
OF A COUPt
WILLIAM B. HARVEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The coup d'6tat in Ghana on February 24, 1966, carried out by the
army with police support, ended the fifteen year old government of
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Of that period, almost nine years had
elapsed since the British colonial power withdrew and granted
sovereign independence to the former Gold Coast on March 6, 1957.
Ghana was the first of the colonial territories of black Africa to
achieve independence, and Dr. Nkrumah's government carried the
hopes and aspirations not only of the Ghanaian people but of many
others. Colonial apologists awaited the justification of a century's
bearing of the white man's burden. Critics of imperialism wel-
comed the cutting of political bonds as a first step toward complete
economic and cultural emancipation. More ominously, the cold
war antagonists began to marshal their forces for encounters in a
new theater.
The Nkrumah government achieved the remarkable feat of dis-
appointing everyone. Ghana's economy was shattered by a disas-
trous drop in the international price of cocoa, by the waste of re-
sources on nonproductive prestige projects, and by increasing cor-
ruption among governmental officials. The massive popular sup-
port Nkrumah had enjoyed at independence was eroded steadily by
the economic disappointments of the people and by governmental
mismanagement. Dr. Nkrumah's reaction to growing signs of polit-
ical discontent was increasing authoritarianism. He alienated fel-
low African leaders by his compulsive drive for dominance and by
his support of subversion in their territories. The Western powers
endured his shrill denunciations without major retaliation but
grew more reluctant to provide the aid that he sought for bolstering
the limping economy. To the Eastern powers he was hardly more
satisfactory. Though his government was officially committed to
socialist development, economic plans usually were ignored at the
implementation level, the private sector of the economy was har-
assed but not eliminated, and misconceived government enterprises
dissipated public resources. Nkrumah's Ghana was clearly not an
Eastern satellite; at best it was a sympathetic, but unpredictable,
supporter.
In these circumstances, the coup of February 24 provided no sur-
prises. Fighting was brief, and the few casualties incurred were
t This article is based upon developments through July 19, 1966, the
date of National Liberation Council Decree No. 65.
* Dean of the School of Law and Professor of Law and Government,
Indiana University. A.B., 1943, Wake Forest College; J.D., 1949, University
of Michigan.
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largely among the President's personal guard. The army's action
was greeted by widespread rejoicing. Though the inadequacies and
misdeeds of the Nkrumah regime were great, even the army's delay
in intervening was predictable: it had maintained the strong non-
political imprint of its British parentage.
It seems most improbable that Dr. Nkrumah will be able to re-
impose his control on Ghana, despite his fulminations from Guinea,
where President Sekou Toure has accorded him the ambiguous
status of co-President. The new government is peacefully and
firmly in control, and it is to the structure, powers, and policies of
that government that we will now direct our attention. This article
will sketch briefly the legal profile of a coup d'tat and seek in its
subsequent enactments clues to the future legal and governmental
development of Ghana.
II. POST-NKRUMAH CHANGES
A. The Executive
Two days after the coup its leaders formally declared the structure
and powers of the new government. A proclamation established
the National Liberation Council with Lieutenant General J. A.
Ankrah as chairman and Commissioner of Police J. W. K. Harlley as
deputy chairman. As originally constituted, the Council consisted
of four army officers and three police officials, but today the mem-
bership is balanced between them.'
The Proclamation also suspended the Republican Constitution
of 1960, dismissed Dr. Nkrumah from his offices of President and
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, dissolved the National
Assembly, dismissed all ministers, and abolished the Presidential
Commission that had been set up to exercise the powers of the
President during Dr. Nkrumah's absence from the country. Nkru-
mah's Convention Peoples' Party, the only lawful political organiza-
tion since 1964,2 was dissolved, and membership in it prohibited.
Into this governmental vacuum stepped the National Liberation
Council. It reserved to itself plenary legislative power, to be exer-
cised by decree,8 as well as the full competences granted by any
preexisting law to the President, the cabinet, or a minister.4 Thus
I The Council's first decree added another member from the police.
National Liberation Council Decree No. 1 (1966). [National Liberation
Council Decree will hereinafter be cited as N.L.C.D.].
2 Republican Constitution, 1960, art. IA. This article was added by the
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964, Pub. Act 224 (Ghana).
3 Proclamation For The Constitution of a National Liberation Council
for the Administration of Ghana and for Other Matters Connected There-
with § 3. [The Proclamation For The Constitution of a National Libera-
tion Council for the Administration of Ghana and for Other Matters Con-
nected Therewith will hereinafter be cited as Proclamation].
4 Proclamation § 7; National Liberation Council (Proclamation)(Amendment) Decree (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 1, § 2 (1966).
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the Council became the government of Ghana, merging in itself all
legislative and executive powers. In practical operative effect, this
consolidation of powers in the Council probably did not differ from
that previously enjoyed by Dr. Nkrumah and his close advisors.
Nevertheless, the "Proclamation for the Constitution of a National
Liberation Council for the Administration of Ghana and for Other
Matters Connected Therewith" stripped away the legal facade of
separation of the powers and functions of the President from those
of the National Assembly and abandoned the theory of minimally
limited government that the Republican Constitution had preserved
by reserving to the people the power to amend the Constitution in
certain respects.5
Though the Council assumed all ministerial powers, it showed a
marked reluctance to distribute portfolios among its members.
Apparently fearing that such a move would cast Council members
in an unduly "political" role, it undertook to act only in its corporate
capacity. Since this ideal was not fully practicable, the Council
initially delegated to senior civil servants acting as the principal
secretaries or heads of ministries the numerous ministerial func-
tions laid down by statute. In the exercise of these functions,
however, the civil servants were made subject to such directions
as the Council might give.6 By a later decision, ministerial port-
folios were assigned to the various members of the Council.
In a search for greater insight into the existing administrative
machinery of government and for ways in which it might be im-
proved, the Council has established an Administrative Committee. 7
The duties of the Committee include advising the Council on all mat-
ters of central and local government administration and making
recommendations on organization, staffing, and training. Prior to
the establishment of this Committee, however, basic changes in the
structure of local government had been decreed. Provision was
made for the replacement of the elective councils at various local
government levels by "management committees" to be appointed
by the Council. These committees are to perform all functions pre-
viously exercisable by the elective councils, and they, like their
predecessors, are governed by the Local Government Act of 1961.
The membership structure provided for the management commit-
tees further reflects the reliance by the Council on technicians and
its effort to depoliticize government at all levels.8
5 For a discussion of the Republican Constitution, 1960, see HARVEY,
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA passim (1966).
6 Ministers' Functions (Delegation) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 11 (1966).
7 National Liberation Council (Administrative Committee) (Appoint-
ment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 31 (1966).
8 Illustrative is the composition of a city or municipal committee: (a)
the senior medical officer, (b) the regional education officer, (c) the assist-
ant chief planning officer, (d) the regional engineer of the Ghana National
Construction Corporation, and (e) a private person nominated by the sen-
ior police officer of the region.
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B. The Judiciary
Of the basic governmental structures of Ghana, the judiciary was
affected least by the coup. The Proclamation provided that, de-
spite the suspension of the Constitution, the courts should continue
to function with the same powers as before. Judges and all others
holding posts in the judicial service were continued upon the pre-
coup terms and conditions of service.9 The judges were required
to take a new oath, however, swearing to act not only in accordance
with the "laws and usage," 10 but also in accordance with the "de-
crees" of Ghana.1
Nevertheless, the judiciary still bore the scars of the Nkrumah
period. In 1961, legislation had been enacted to create special crim-
inal courts to deal with offenses against the safety of the state.'2
In late 1963, the government's inability to procure from such a
court the conviction of three defendants accused of treason brought
the dismissal of Sir Arku Korsah as Chief Justice, the resignation
of Sir Arku and Mr. Justice William B. Van Lare from the Supreme
Court, and legislation authorizing the President to void the special
court's judgment of acquittal.13 A more fundamental consequence
of the acquittal, however, was a constitutional amendment granting
the President summary power to dismiss any judge of the superior
courts.' 4 Dr. Nkrumah promptly exercised this power in dismissing
one High Court judge and three judges of the Supreme Court, in-
cluding the sole survivor of the special criminal court.
After the coup, the National Liberation Council acted promptly
to remove these impingements on the judiciary. A Judicial Service
Commission of six members was established, consisting of the Chief
Justice as chairman, the most senior judge of the Supreme Court,
the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commis-
sion, and two nominees of the National Liberation Council, who
must be retired judges of the superior courts.' Important func-
tions in the selection and discipline of judges and judicial officers
are assigned to the Commission. The Chief Justice and other
9 Proclamation § 2(3).
10 Oaths Act, 1960, Constitutional Act 12, First Schedule.
11 National Liberation Council (Oaths) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 6, § 1
(1966).
12 The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1961, Pub. Act 91(Ghana), later replaced by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1964,
Pub. Act 238 (Ghana).
13 The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1963, Pub. Act
223 (Ghana).
14 The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964, Pub. Act 224, § 6(c)(Ghana).
15 Judicial Service Act, 1960 (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 39, §
2 (1966), as amended by Judicial Service Act, 1960, (Amendment) (No. 2)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 58 (1966). As originally constituted by N.L.C.D. No.
39 (1966), the Commission included two representatives of the bar and did
not include the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission.
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judges of the Supreme Court and High Court are to be appointed by
the National Liberation Council acting on the advice of the Judicial
Service Commission. 6 The Council has similar appointive powers
with respect to lower court judges, but it may delegate these powers
to the Judicial Service Commission. 17 Protection of judicial tenure
has been reinstituted. Judges of the Supreme Court and High
Court may be removed only by the National Liberation Council,
acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, for either
stated misbehavior or infirmity of body or mind. Their salaries
cannot be diminished while they remain in office.' 8 Lower court
judges still do not enjoy these usual safeguards of judicial inde-
pendence, but the power to discipline them has been removed from
the President or his designee' and vested in the National Liberation
Council. However, its action is subject to the binding advice of the
Judicial Service Commission. 20
One of the most typical expressions of authoritarianism is the
creation of special courts to deal with criminal prosecutions in par-
ticular cases or series of cases, frequently those involving political
opposition to the incumbent regime. The Working Paper on The
Rule of Law in a Free Society, prepared for the International Com-
mission of Jurists meeting in New Delhi in 1959, declared, with
justification, that "the trial of accused persons must take place be-
fore an independent court. Special courts created ad hoc for a
particular case or series of cases endanger fair trial or at least create
pursuance [sic] of instructions given by the Executive. ' '21 The spe-
cial criminal court in Ghana amply illustrated these dangers. It
operated under summary procedures and modes of proof estab-
lished by the President and with a jury selected from a special
list.2 2 Its judgment was final and unreviewable. When one such
court resisted executive pressure and acquitted the accused, the
judgment was voided and the defendants re-tried. On retrial,
a conviction was predictably returned.
16 Judicial Service Act, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 39,
§ 1(3) (1966).
17 Judicial Service Act, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 39,
§ 3(a) (1966).
18 Judicial Service Act, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 39,
§§ 1(4), 7 (1966).
19 Judicial Service Act, 1960, Constitutional Act 10, § 18.
20 Judicial Service Act, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No, 39,
§ 3(c), (d) (1966).
21 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 318 (1959).
22 The original special courts legislation excluded jury trial. The Crim-
inal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1961, Pub. Act 91, § 3(3) (Ghana);
Criminal Procedure Code, 1959, Pub. Act 30, §§ 242-45 (Ghana). After the
acquittal of three defendants in late 1963 the constitution of a special
criminal court was revised by substituting for the former three-judge court
a judge of the superior courts sitting with a jury of twelve persons drawn
from a special list of jurors. The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
1964, Pub. Act 238, & 1 (Ghana).
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Treatment of the special criminal court by the National Libera-
tion Council was prompt and decisive. The court was abolished, the
legislation authorizing it was repealed, and the retrial conviction
of the five defendants charged with treason was declared null and
void.23 However, three of the defendants, who long had been as-
sociated with Dr. Nkrumah's government, were retained in "pro-
tective custody. ' '24
C. Public Service
To assure the necessary continuity of government, the initial
Proclamation of the National Liberation Council continued the
public services of Ghana as they existed before the coup.25 The
Council in fact has been inclined to rely heavily on the senior civil
servants for various quasi-political or policy-oriented roles. As
has been noted, ministerial functions were delegated to the princi-
pal secretaries 0  Public service technical personnel dominate the
management committees that are to replace the local government
councils.2 7 The Economic Committee, the first appointed by the
Council and surely the most important, is composed predominantly
of senior civil servants. The committee is charged with responsi-
bility for studying the present state of the economy and recom-
mending ways of rehabilitating it.28
D. Law of Ghana
Despite the revolutionary change effected by the coup d'ktat, the
legal order of Ghana remained remarkably stable. The original
Proclamation of the National Liberation Council continued in force
all enactments and rules of law as they existed prior to the coup,
subject, of course, to the plenary legislative power of the Council.2 9
In this body of law, decrees of the National Liberation Council have
effected a number of significant amendments. In addition to those
discussed under other headings, several merit brief mention. The
offense of unlawful exportation of cocoa has been reduced from a
second degree felony to a misdemeanor, with a consequent reduc-
tion of penalty.30 The Criminal Code was further amended to
make punishable violent entry into any building or onto land,
23 Criminal Procedure (Special Criminal Division) (Abolition) Decree,
N.L.C.D. No. 43 (1966).
24 National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) (Amendment) (No.
4) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 44 (1966).
25 Proclamation § 5.
26 Ministers' Functions (Delegation) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 11 (1966).
27 See Local Government (Interim Administration) Decree, N.L.C.D. No.
26 (1966).
28 National Liberation Council (Economic Committee) (Appointment)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 4 (1966).
29 Proclamation § 3(2), (3).
30 Criminal Code, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 28 (1966).
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even by a person entitled to possession. 1 The 1959 enactment that
provided for suspending any pension or allowance upon the de-
tention of the entitled person under the Preventive Detention Act
was repealed retroactively, thus entitling the pensioner to all
payments withheld. 32
The prospect of a broad review and revision of the body of law
appeared when the Council appointed a Legal Committee composed
of certain judges of the Supreme Court, the principal government
lawyers, four leading practitioners, and a representative of the law
faculty of the University of Ghana.3 3 The Committee has been
given responsibility for examining the existing law, recommending
revisions, and making other suggestions on legal matters, "including
matters preparatory to the setting up of a commission to consider
a new constitution for the country. ' '3 4 The activity of the Legal
Committee thus far has been disappointing. It appears doubtful
that it will become a significant force for either law reform or the
development of new legal institutions.
The inadequacies of the Legal Committee are illustrated by a
decree that it recommended to the Council. The proposed decree,
which the Council promulgated, 5 repealed rent stabilization legis-
lation enacted in 1962 and 1963.36 Regulations issued under this
legislation had imposed a nominal rental of one shilling per year on
cocoa land held by a member of the owning stool and five shillings
per acre if the landholder was not a member of the owning stool.37
Repeal of the 1962 legislation restored the effect of customary law
rules applicable to such tenancies, which, in the main, provided for
substantially higher rentals. My criticism of the repealing decree
is not now directed at its substantive effects. Rather, it is di-
rected toward the Legal Committee for recommending and the
Council for legislating on such a vital subject without adequate
study of the effects of the controls and the consequences of their
removal. Illustratively, what were the economic and political
implications of the rent control measures? Who are the principal
beneficiaries of their removal, chiefly landowners or the public
treasury? How does the repeal affect the politically sensitive status
of the chiefs and other traditional rulers? My personal inquiries
reveal no evidence that the Legal Committee considered these ques-
tions or advised the Council on them before recommending the
31 Criminal Code, 1960, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 47 (1966).
32 Pensions (Special Provisions) Act, 1959, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.
C.D. No. 55 (1966).
33 National Liberation Council (Legal Committee) (Appointment) De-
cree, N.L.C.D. No. 38 (1966), as amended by N.L.C.D. No. 56 (1966).
34 National Liberation Council (Legal Committee) (Appointment) De-
cree, N.L.C.D. No. 38, § 3 (1966).
35 Rents Stabilization Acts (Repeal) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 49 (1966).
36 The Rents (Stabilization) Act, 1962, Pub. Act 109 (Ghana); The
Rents (Stabilization) Act, 1963, Pub. Act 168 (Ghana).
87 The Rents (Cocoa Farms) Regulations, 1962, L.I. 186.
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repeal of the rent stabilization acts. Rather, the only professed
basis for the recommendation was the unpopularity of the controls
in the affected areas.
E. Political Controls
The enactments discussed under this heading reflect the efforts
of the National Liberation Council to move against the ousted
Nkrumah regime as well as to provide curbs against political ac-
tivity generally. The former may be divided into provisions to
neutralize politically individuals and associations that supported
Dr. Nkrumah and measures to publicize and punish various cor-
rupt practices of the former government and its members and sup-
porters.
The initial Proclamation of the National Liberation Council not
only dismissed Dr. Nkrumah, his ministers, and the National As-
sembly; it also dissolved the Convention Peoples' Party and pro-
hibited membership in it.38 Later decrees began the process of re-
moving the imprint of the Party and of Dr. Nkrumah from various
features of national life. No longer is the Party flag the national
emblem; the original design was readopted for the national flag.39
The title of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Tech-
nology lost its reference to the former President. 40 More signifi-
cantly, certain wing organizations of the Convention Peoples' Party
were dissolved and organizational acts with respect to them pro-
hibited under criminal penalties. 41
The most extreme sanction applied to members and supporters
of the ousted government has been detention. The Preventive
Detention Act, probably the most hated and feared enactment
under Nkrumah, originally was kept in force, 42 but soon was re-
pealed.43 Even before repeal, however, the Council had laid the
legal foundation for its own detention powers under the euphemism
of "protective custody. '44  The protective custody net has been
sweeping. Many persons have been held as part of a class, e.g.,
all members of the dissolved Parliament or all district commis-
sioners.45 Subsequent decrees have authorized protective custody
38 Proclamation § 2(2) (e).
39 National Liberation Council (Proclamation) (Amendment) Decree,
N.L.C.D. No. 1, § 3 (1966).
40 National Liberation Council (Kwame Nkrumah University of Science
and Technology) (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 33 (1966).
41 National Liberation Council (Dissolution of Ghana Moslem Council
and National Council of Ghana Women) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 15 (1966).
42 Proclamation § 3(2).
43 Preventive Detention Act, 1964, (Repeal) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 30
(1966).
44 National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) Decree, N.L.C.D.
No. 2 (1966).
45 National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) Decree, N.L.C.D.
No. 2, Schedule (1966).
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for 446 named individuals.46 Descriptions of the detained persons
rarely suggest the basis for their detention; they range from "Fi-
nancial Advisor to the Presidency" to "Lorry Driver" and "C.P.P.
Activist." There are some familiar names: Tawia Adamafio, Ako
Adjei and Cofie Crabbe, first imprisoned by Dr. Nkrumah under the
Preventive Detention Act, were later convicted of treason on re-
trial in the special criminal court. After the voiding of this judg-
ment by the National Liberation Council and the repeal of the Pre-
ventive Detention Act, they continue their confinement in protec-
tive custody.
Dr. Nkrumah's government was not only oppressive; it was
appallingly corrupt. A major part of the post-coup activity has
been directed toward ferreting out official wrongdoing, laying the
basis for criminal prosecutions, and tracing assets that can be re-
turned to the public coffers. The Ollennu Commission has been
inquiring into official misconduct connected with the issuance of
import licenses; another commission under Mr. Justice Apaloo has
been investigating the former President's property. Pending the
reports of these commissions, legal tools have been devised for
immobilizing assets and in some cases forfeiting them to the gov-
ernment.
By decree, the National Liberation Council has forbidden nu-
merous persons and organizations to withdraw funds from bank ac-
counts or remove valuables deposited with a bank as security or
for safekeeping. 47 Bankers similarly are forbidden to pay out funds
or return valuables and are obliged to provide information to the
Council concerning accounts or other valuables. Persons with ac-
counts affected include Dr. Nkrumah and his wife, all members of
Parliament and ministers, all regional commissioners, and many
persons named as individuals. The organizations include the Con-
vention Peoples' Party and wing organizations such as the Young
Pioneers' Movement and the National Council of Ghana Women.
When an individual account is blocked, the decree always includes
the named person and his wife. As to whether a woman is the wife
of a person named in a decree, whether a particular account belongs
to a named person, and other critical factual issues, a certificate
signed by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the National Lib-
eration Council is made conclusive. There is no provision for hear-
ing interested parties before the certificate is issued. The prohibi-
tions of the decrees are enforced by substantial criminal sanctions.
46 N.L.C.D. No. 37 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 41 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 42
(1966); N.L.C.D. No. 44 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 45 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 53
(1966).
47 National Liberation Council (Bank Accounts) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 7(1966), as amended by N.L.C.D. No. 9 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 13 (1966);
N.L.C.D. No. 21 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 24 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 32 (1966);
N.L.C.D. No. 35 (1966); N.L.C.D. No. 57 (1966); and N.L.C.D. No. 60 (1966).
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By another series of decrees,48 the Council has authorized the
Auditor General to investigate the accounts of a number of organ-
izations and to report to it his findings, as well as "such comments
and recommendations as appear to the Auditor General to, be in
the public interest to make." For these purposes, the Auditor Gen-
eral has been given extensive investigatory powers. Affirmative
obligations to provide him information on the nature and extent of
property belonging to the scheduled organizations have been im-
posed on persons in possession or control of it. These obligations,
as well as the prohibition of disposition of property without the
Auditor General's direction, are enforced by criminal sanctions.
Fifteen organizations have been scheduled for investigation, in-
cluding the Convention Peoples' Party and its wing organizations,
the Cocoa Marketing Board, and both the African Affairs Centre
and the Bureau of African Affairs.
The earlier decrees freezing the assets of persons or organiza-
tions associated with Dr. Nkrumah applied only to bank accounts
and deposits of valuables with banks, for security or safekeeping.
Later the net was cast more widely. A subsequent decree prohib-
ited the transfer of other assets such as land, buildings, bonds,
shares of stock, motor vehicles, and jewelry. 49 All post-coup trans-
fers by the scheduled organizations or persons were voided unless
approved by the Council, except those transfers made pursuant to
a court order or authorized by an enactment. Again the affected
owners included Dr. Nkrumah and his wife, a number of categories
of individuals, forty-eight other named persons, and three organiza-
tions.
The decrees thus far considered have frozen assets pending the
auditing of accounts and other investigations. For a number of
organizations, however, summary forfeiture of all assets has been
decreed.50  Ownership of the forfeited assets was vested in the
Council subject to disposition "in such manner as the National Lib-
eration Council may direct."' 51 The organizations whose assets were
scheduled for such forfeiture are the Convention Peoples' Party,
the Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council, the Young Pioneers
Movement, the Ideological Institute at Winneba, the African Af-
fairs Centre, the Bureau of African Affairs, the Moslem Council,
and the National Council of Ghana Women. A later decree sim-
ilarly forfeited all assets of two other organizations, the Market
48 National Liberation Council (Auditor-General's Functions) Decree,
N.L.C.D. No. 12 (1966), as amended by N.L.C.D. No. 22 (1966); N.L.C.D. No.
46 (1966); and N.L.C.D. No. 48 (1966).
49 National Liberation Council (Prohibition of Transfers of Assets) De-
cree, N.L.C.D. No. 40 (1966).
50 National Liberation Council (Forfeiture of Assets) Decree, N.L.C.D.
No. 23 (1966).
51 National Liberation Council (Forfeiture of Assets) Decree, N.L.C.D.
No. 23, § 3 (1966).
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Women's Union and Nkrumah Kurye Kaw, and, in addition, dis-
solved the organizations.5 2
The foregoing measures were directed at persons and groups
closely identified with the ousted regime. The National Lib-
eration Council has made clear, however, that it seeks a general
moratorium on political activity. In his radio address at the end
of the first one hundred days, General Ankrah, Chairman of the
National Liberation Council, declared that "we cannot at this stage
afford to indulge in Party political wrangles when we are con-
fronted with the spectre of economic bankruptcy . . . . Until the
preparatory work [for eventual return to civilian administration]
has been satisfactorily completed, the Council will not tolerate any
form of Party political activities and will take drastic steps against
persons trying to defy its decrees."53' Within a week of the coup,
this posture had been given legal effect.
By a decree for the "preservation of public peace," the Council
prohibited the formation or operation of any political party. 54 It
also prohibited, under criminal penalties, "all activities whatsoever
likely to assist in the formation or operation of a political party."55
Under such a broad prohibition with such lack of definiteness, vir-
tually any group activity could be in jeopardy. As a potential po-
litical force, the Ex-Political Detainees Organization has been dis-
solved and organizational activities connected with it prohibited
under severe penalties.56
The present effort to depoliticize the country does not, in Gen-
eral Ankrah's words, "imply that the Council intends to remain
in power indefinitely. At the opportune time, the country will
revert to civilian rule, and the Council is taking appropriate steps
to prepare the grounds for that."57  The first of these steps is the
appointment of a Political Committee.5" Under the chairmanship
of Mr. Edward Akufo-Addo, a distinguished lawyer who was dis-
missed from the Supreme Court by Dr. Nkrumah, the Committee
covers a wide political spectrum. Not surprisingly, supporters of
the dissolved Convention Peoples' Party have been excluded. Func-
tions of the Committee include making proposals to the Council on
52 National Liberation Council (Dissolution and Forfeiture of Assets)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 3 (1966).
53 "First 100 Days," broadcast speech by Lt. General J. A. Ankrah, June
3, 1966.
54 National Liberation Council (Preservation of Public Peace) Decree,
N.L.C.D. No. 3 (1966).
55 National Liberation Council (Preservation of Public Peace) Decree,
N.L.C.D. No. 3, § 2 (1966).
56 National Liberation Council (Dissolution of the Ex-Political De-
tainees Organization) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 34 (1966).
57 "First 100 Days," broadcast speech by Lt. General J. A. Ankrah, June
3, 1966.
58 National Liberation Council (Political Committee) (Appointment)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 59 (1966).
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changes in laws or policies to serve better the public interest and
the interests of the people of Ghana and advising the Council on
matters referred by it to the Committee. All doubt as to the
nature of the Committee is removed, however: It "shall act solely
as an advisory body to the National Liberation Council and . . . the
Council is not obliged to accept any proposal, suggestion or advice
submitted."59
F. Economic Reform
No concern of the National Liberation Council has been more
pronounced than that relating to Ghana's economy. With the rav-
aging effects of an unfavorable international market for its primary
export compounded by official waste, mismanagement, and cor-
ruption, the economy urgently demands reform. Yet thus far this
pressing concern has been reflected relatively little in the formal
enactments of the Council. An Economic Committee has been ap-
pointed to study and recommend, 0 certain taxes have been re-
duced, 61 the penalties for certain currency offenses have been re-
vised,12 and customs and excise tariffs amended.8 3 The enact-
ments discussed in the preceding section may be viewed appropri-
ately not only as political weapons against the Convention Peoples'
Party but as a concerted attack against the pervasive official cor-
ruption that has drained off public funds. The Council also has
announced plans to turn over a number of unprofitable state en-
terprises to the private sector of the economy and to invite private
participation in several others.
While the Council pledged its immediate preoccupation with the
economy, its actions have not been precipitate. Thus far it has
decreed only minor adjustments. Presumably studies currently
proceeding will suggest more fundamental reform. There is little
evidence as yet, however, to indicate the new routes on fundamental
policy that the Council proposes to follow.
III. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
It is premature to assess the accomplishments or failures of the
National Liberation Council. Having ousted a corrupt, oppressive,
and ineffective government, the Council understandably is pre-
occupied with moving against the malfeasants, removing the most
blatant expressions of political oppression, and rationalizing basic
governmental administration. The Council has pledged itself to
59 National Liberation Council (Political Committee) (Appointment)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 59, § 4 (1966).
60 National Liberation Council (Economic Committee) (Appointment)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 4 (1966).
61 Ghana (Reduction of Taxation) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 5 (1966).
62 Currency Act, 1964, (Amendment) Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 8 (1966).
03 Customs and Excise Tariff Regulations, 1966, (L.I. 504) (Amendment)
Decree, N.L.C.D. No. 63 (1966).
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humane, honest, and effective government; to "a strong and pro-
gressive welfare society in which no one will have any anxiety
about the basic needs of life . . . a society in which the individual
Ghanaian will be able to enjoy a modern standard of living based
on gainful employment"; to "the suppression, repeal or amendment
of those obnoxious laws, Nkrumah's instruments of tyranny and
oppression with which he reduced the people of Ghana to virtual
slavery and abject misery"; and to restoration of "the rule of law
and basic human rights to the people of Ghana." These measures
are to be taken, however, without "resort to indiscriminate acts of
vengeance against those who were associated with the discredited
party. '64 There is no reason to doubt the dedication of the Council
to these objectives, and it deserves the patience and understanding
of its own people and the world as it pursues them.
Forbearance from condemnation, however, should not foreclose
an expression of concern when remedial measures adopted by the
Council follow discredited patterns employed by the ousted re-
gime. The euphemism of "protective custody" does not conceal the
fact that without charge or trial large numbers of persons have
been deprived of their liberty. Some have been released, but many
remain in prison. Serious infringements of property interests have
been decreed without affording affected parties an opportunity for
a fair hearing. Ex parte official determinations of factual issues
crucial to the application of sanctions have been made conclusive.
Total legislative and executive power has been consolidated in
the eight members of the Council, and steps for the validation of
that power by the consent of the governed lie in the unforseeable
future. Certain modifications have been made in the law without
the careful antecedent study that could assure a rational relation of
enactment to social needs and governmental purposes.
As a result of the coup d'6tat Ghana now has a new opportunity,
unencumbered by the euphoria of newly gained independence, to
restructure public power and reshape legal institutions. Difficult,
indeed tragic, though the last decade has been, it can provide the
new constitutional and legal order with useful insights into the
nation's needs. This essay will conclude with a few suggestions of
the most important of these needs.
A. Executive Domination
The cardinal feature of the Nkrumah government was the pro-
gressive consolidation of power in the executive. Initially by his
great political skills and popularity, and later by legal and extra-
legal measures, Dr. Nkrumah decimated his political opposition and
reduced the National Assembly to complete inconsequence and
irrelevance. The constitutional amendments of 1964 gave him ul-
64 "First 100 Days," broadcast speech by Lt. General J. A. Ankrah, June
3, 1966.
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timate power over the judiciary. This one-party, indeed one-man,
domination of all fundamental organs and powers of government
predictably produced a corrupt tyranny. Arguments for the con-
centration of governmental powers and against a system of checks
and balances rely primarily upon the undoubted shortage of qual-
ified manpower and upon the widely perceived need for a vigorous,
effective response to demands for economic and social development.
The Ghanaian experience of the past decade seriously compromises
the persuasiveness of these arguments for the consolidation of un-
limited governmental power in the hands of a small revolutionary
elite. No better example than Dr. Nkrumah need be offered of
the corroding and corrupting effect of total power. Whatever the
price in speed and efficiency of governmental action exacted by
dispersion of power among governmental organs that check and
control each other, that price is justified if it provides safeguards
against the authoritarianism, the pervasive fear, the insecurity of
the Nkrumah regime.
Ghana's experience does not suggest that a system of checks and
balances must be based in any major way upon the recognition and
use of divisive, sub-national power centers with their attendant loy-
alties, such as chiefs or other traditional rulers. A prominent
Western diplomat suggested to me after the coup that the chiefs
should play an important role in the new constitutional order of
Ghana. I would regard any such development as serious retrogres-
sion. Vital though some of the stools may be as religious and cul-
tural forces, they are ill-fitted to play significant roles in modern
government. Adequate safeguards against a dangerous concentra-
tion of power can be achieved by the allocation of limiting and bal-
ancing roles to legislative and judicial organs under constitutional
and legislative norms. The objective is not to fragment fragile na-
tional entities nor to immobilize government. It is rather to provide
sufficient assurance against that monopolization of all govern-
ment powers in the same hands that invites tyranny.
B. Creation of the New Institutions
The easiest task of the National Liberation Council will be the
elimination of these offensive aspects of the constitutional and
legal order associated with the Nkrumah regime. The equally im-
portant but far more difficult task will be the creation of new in-
stitutions to avoid dangers and meet needs starkly revealed by
recent experience. Three kinds of institutions may be mentioned
briefly for illustration.
1. LEGISLATIVE
If legislative innovation emerges full-blown from the brow of a
Jovian executive, it has enormous potential for both social disrup-
tion and ineffectiveness in attaining its stated or assumed objectives.
Even the laudable eclecticism of African leaders may create grave
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problems. Foreign legislative models, highly successful on their
native soil, may be entirely inappropriate to African circumstances.
Legislative initiatives should be based on a careful study of the
social, economic, and political facts obtaining in the country and a
careful choice of techniques to serve clearly conceived goals. One
of many illustrations of Nkrumah's failure in this connection was
the abortive Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bill of 1963. A
similar failure of the National Liberation Council may be found in
the decree restoring customary law rules to tenancies of cocoa
lands.6 5
Procedures should be devised and institutionally assured to re-
duce the frequency of such failures in the future legislative pro-
gram of Ghana. Among the possibilities deserving consideration
are the establishment of substantive standing committees of a re-
stored Parliament to study legislative proposals, more frequent
use of specialized ad hoc commissions to investigate problems and
recommend legislative solutions, the establishment of an adequately
staffed and financed Law Revision Commission, and the support of
more active and more relevant social research in the universities.
The procedures adopted should include both resort to competent
social, economic, and legal research by specialists and regularized
opportunities for those affected by legislative proposals to urge
their views in open hearing.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE
Professor Hayek's contention that any official discretion is in-
compatible with those decencies of government commonly sub-
sumed by the "rule of law" cannot be sustained. 6 It reflects a
yearning for governmental passivity that current conditions, par-
ticularly in the underdeveloped parts of the world, render unthink-
able. Official action under grants of discretionary power is in-
evitable and, in fact, desirable. It is equally desirable, however,
that the discretion of officials be circumscribed by standards that
permit a review of their actions and a determination whether they
have acted within the proper scope of their authority. A common
phenomenon under Dr. Nkrumah was a grant of broad discretion to
an official to take action, and to take it at such times as he believed
the public interest required. This should be replaced by norms
that articulate the policy goals, specify the official with authority
to act, and indicate the standards that are to control his discretion.
The establishment of such a pattern in granting official powers
is an indispensable first step toward responsible and decent gov-
ernment. The true villain is not discretionary power; it is official
action unauthorized by any legal norm, or authorization to act
within an uncontrolled discretion. It is also the absence of an ef-
65 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
66 _AyEK, THE ROAp TO SgRFDOM passim (1944).
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fective system of administrative review that can be invoked by the
citizen who is adversely affected by the acts of officials. Therefore,
the architects of the new constitutional and legal order of Ghana
should give careful attention to the development of a body of ad-
ministrative law permitting the citizen to demand effectively that
the officials justify their action in a legal norm, and curbing actions
that a competent tribunal cannot find to be related rationally to
the standards guiding discretion.
3. ECONOMIC PLANNING
The action of the National Liberation Council in withdrawing the
state entirely or in part from certain enterprises suggests that
future governmental intervention in the economy may be less than
in the past. More generally, many development economists today
are questioning attempts to devise overall economic plans and are
urging greater reliance on specific project planning and implemen-
tation. Whether such a trend will develop in Ghana is now un-
predictable. It is predictable, however, that the continuing role of
the government in the economy will be substantial and that some
effort to plan development will be continued.
It is unnecessary now to assess Ghana's past efforts at general
economic planning. Whatever the merits or defects of the plans
themselves may have been, it is clear that at the level of implemen-
tation they were almost total failures. Even in the planning phase
itself, the planners were unable to rely on the active cooperation of
ministers and civil servants. Once the plan was prepared, it had
no determinate legal status, and the guidelines it provided in allo-
cating scarce resources and coordinating government actions were
ignored frequently at the ministerial and presidential levels. The
resulting pattern of ad hoc decisions, in league with international
market conditions, accelerated the deterioration of the economy.
It is difficult to believe that even the staunchest advocate of plan-
ning would contend that the Ghana variety under Dr. Nkrumah
was better than the untrammeled play of market forces.
If Ghana's economic development is to be planned, the lawmakers
must devise legal institutions for the improvement of both plan
formulation and implementation. Assured access of the planners
to all governmental data is an indispensable minimum. Formal
legal status for a planning commission, including not merely spec-
ialists but also representatives of the executive and legislative
body as well, would be desirable. Granting it power to review and
coordinate all ministerial budgetary requests also might be con-
sidered. Providing the planning commission with its own legal
staff might help to assure continuing adaptation of the legal order
to the needs of development.
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C. Political Participation
In conclusion, a brief word on the most important aspect of the
legal order-that which structures the citizen's participation in his
government. Aside from the indeterminate potential role of the
Political Committee, no such participation now exists in Ghana.
The desire of the Council for a respite from politics until it sets the
government's house in order is understandable. I believe, however,
that the structuring of a wider participation by the people and their
leaders is among the most urgent tasks before the new government.
Basically democratic institutions characterized the indigenous or-
der of Ghana. Even under Nkrumah the formal facade of a rep-
resentative democracy was preserved, and the Party, with its wing
organizations, provided minimal channels of communication be-
tween the people and those in power. The people greeted the ouster
of the Nkrumah government with general approval. Within the
populace there is now no evidence of deep cleavages, tensions, or
hostilities that would make the return of a more open political
society dangerous to the public peace. I doubt profoundly that any
people has ever become adept in the art of democratic government
solely through the tutelage of a self-appointed military junta. The
constitutional and legal machinery for popular participation in
solving the problems left by the Nkrumah regime and in building a
secure and humane society in Ghana calls for early attention.
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